Law and Justice
Offence
Human society is a cooperative enterprise whose goal is the
increase of human idleness, and the maintenance of a social
equality of idleness. The manufacture, trade, and use of tools
is the primary way in which human societies increase idleness.
But apart from its economic transactions, there are other social
interactions which have effects on the idleness of members of
a society.
Offences of one sort or other are actions by persons which result
in a loss to other persons of idleness or idle time. The theft of
a person's tools or other possessions results in a loss to them
of the idle time which is the value of these tools. Similarly the
damage or destruction of their personal possessions, property, or
person results in loss of idle time. The obstruction or detention
of a person results in loss of idle time.
Offences are any actions whatsoever whose effect is to reduce
the idleness of other persons.
For greater clarification, a society may publish a list of
proscribed offences - such as theft, assault, murder, vandalism,
fraud, trespass, nuisance -, but these are simply particular instances
of the general class of Offence.
Offence
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Effects of the offence
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Theft
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The theft of useful tools from someone results in decreased
idleness for that person, as they no longer gain the value
of those tools. Useful tools include clothing, shelter, medicines.
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Assault
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Assault that causes pain for some period of time prevents the enjoyment
of idle time for that period, and thus reduces idleness.
Assault which results in damage to a person may reduce their ability
to work, and increase the time they take to perform work.
Where such damage is permanent, the result is a permanent decrease
in idleness.
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Murder
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Since death corresponds to zero idleness, the killing of a person
may be regarded as an act which reduces their idleness
permanently to zero.
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But no list of proscribed offences -
laws - can ever hope to contain all possible actual offences.
Whether or not an offence is listed among the laws of a society,
if a person can prove that some action by another person has
resulted in loss to them, they have a case against that person.
Actions of which other persons disapprove, but which cause them
no loss of time, do not fall under any category of Offence. For example,
if it is customary for people to wear clothes, then public nudity
may cause outrage. Or if it is customary for persons to engage in
sexual activity in private, then public sex may cause outrage.
But in neither of these examples does the activity result in any
decrease in idleness - and such actions ought not to be prohibited
by law.
Offences are performed by one or more persons - the offenders -
against one or more other persons - the offended -. The offenders
may dispute whether they have in fact caused offence. Where offence
has been caused, the offenders and the offended may come to some
mutual agreement. But where agreement is not reached, and the
dispute is of sufficient importance, society may appoint a
magistrate to inquire into the dispute and dispense impartial
justice.
Justice
Where some individual has carried out an offence,
the principle of justice must be that of restitution.
Assuming that a society maintains strict equality, actions which
disturb that perfect equality require compensation which restores
equality.
Justice is not about punishment or retribution. If some person
acts in some way to damage other persons - where damage always means
some reduction of idleness, some loss of idle time - then if the
malefactor is punished by being beaten, mutilated, imprisoned, or
executed, then damage is only multiplied. If one person blinds
another, this damage results in life becoming difficult for the
blind man. But if, in retribution, the malefactor is himself blinded,
then society now has two blind people. If such retribution is made
with every offence, then if one man burns down the house of another,
then his own house should be burned down. Or if he breaks his tools,
then his tools should be broken. Such retributive "justice" can only
result in a society in which substantial numbers of people are
blind, homeless, and without tools. And such a society is one in
which social idleness is low. Retribution damages society, and makes
a bad situation worse. The logic of retribution is such that if
a hole is knocked in one side of a boat, then an equal and equivalent
hole should be knocked in the other side.
Behind the desire to punish malefactors is the supposition that
malefactors are in fact malevolent - that they are free moral agents
who have freely and knowingly chosen to do harm -, and that in
punishing them no damage is done to society. There is, in short,
an assumption that human life is idle life, and that all actions
are consequently freely chosen, and that punishment deprives a person
of his pre-existing freedom. Such an approach has no place in Idle
Theory, because Idle Theory is founded on the premise that human
life is not perfectly idle, and that men are not free agents, but
at best part-time free agents, and the primary goal of human
society is the attainment, as far as possible, of perfect freedom
or idleness. And since men are not
perfectly free moral agents, then it is not possible to determine
whether their actions have been freely chosen, or driven by necessity.
In short, moral culpability depends upon idleness. Perfectly
idle persons are fully morally culpable for all their actions,
but completely busy persons have no moral culpability, because they
can never act according to personal inclination or desire.
Justice is not about judging the character of men, of attempting
to ascertain whether they are malevolent or benevolent, and punishing
them or rewarding them accordingly - because such judgements of
character cannot be made. Justice can only be about repairing
damage, restoring lost equality, making restitution.
Thus where a thief takes someone else's tool for his own use,
and is discovered, what is required is restitution, not punishment.
The thief should give back what he stole, and in addition, should
compensate the owner for the time he lost while he was without the
tool. The thief should either return the tool, or give the owner
another tool of equivalent value, or pay over money to that value,
or perform work of that value. What was taken should be given back,
in one way or other.
What applies to theft applies to all other offences. An offence is
caused when some person costs another person some time. Personal
injury, vandalism, theft, fraud, and the like all cost the injured
party time, and this lost time should be restored,
The only difficulty arises where restitution is impossible.
If a man kills another man, restitution is impossible. Or where
a man starts a fire which causes so much damage that he will never
be able, even working all the days of his life, to compensate
the damage he has caused, complete restitution is impossible.
Or where a man causes damage to another, but the latter dies before
compensation is called for, then compensation is impossible.
In these cases, justice cannot be done. In the case of a killing,
those dependent upon the dead man, or society itself, may require
that compensation be paid to them. In the case of the fire, the
malefactor may be required to work the rest of his days to make
good as much he is able, and society must bear the remainder of
the loss.
In all these cases, the role of a magistrate is to determine,
as best he is able, who caused what amount of damage to whom, and
to require that compensation be paid. Since the magistrate himself,
and his officers, have also been caused trouble, the costs of
administering justice may also be added. The result, for any
malefactor, is that he will always pay more for his actions than
he gained by them. The thief who takes a tool for his own use
gains at most the value inherent in the tool. But when apprehended,
he must not only compensate the owner for the loss of this value,
but also compensate society for the work that it performed to
hunt him down, to try him, and to oversee his repayment.
The only circumstance where a magistrate may consider imprisoning
or executing a malefactor is where his behaviour is such that the
magistrate believes that he will offend again, and that he is a
liability to society, and should be expelled from society.
Here exile is one option. Imprisonment, where a prison is
no different from any other society, except that it is closed off
from the rest of society, may be another. Execution is the last
resort. Exile, imprisonment, or execution are not intended as
punishments of a malefactor, but simply various ways in which a
society rids itself of persons who menace society, or are believed
to menace society. All that matters here is the cost of expulsion.