Modern Times
Idle Theory argues that human beings (and indeed all living
creatures) must act to maintain or increase idleness, or else
face extinction. The entire process of human history, it says, is
one in which human ingenuity acted to reduce the burden of work,
through technology, through ethical conduct, through law.
This process always had, as its goal, a condition of perfect
idleness. It was always accompanied by a dread of the opposite -
a condition of inescapable, unremitting toil.
It is the contention of Idle Theory that received human morality
emerged in times of extreme difficulty, when human life was extremely
busy. During those times,
it was essential that everyone carried an equal burden of work,
that none were more idle than others. At the same time, there arose
taboos against luxuries, games, and promiscuous sex. These ascetic
societies were survival societies. Unequal, self-indulgent societies,
facing the same dire circumstances, simply disintegrated. Only the
ascetic disciplined moralities survived to propagate their ethical
message.
Over many millennia, and largely thanks to that discipline, human
ingenuity gradually increased. Technological innovations began to
multiply at an exponential rate. Recent centuries have seen humans
constructing, in rapid succession, machines powered by coal, oil,
and nuclear energy. A great deal of human work has become automated.
The result has been a rise in human idleness, at least in those
societies where automation is most advanced. And with this rise in
idleness there has arisen an attendant moral liberalism. As idleness
increased, it was no longer necessary for social equality to be
maintained, for luxuries and games to be forbidden, for sexual
relations to be restricted. The institution of slavery, upon which
the ancient world was entirely dependent, has vanished because it
is no longer necessary.
Modern liberalism, the product of
increased idleness, dissolves ancient moral codes.
In the USA, in the 18th century, 19 out of 20 people worked on
the land to produce the food to feed the population.
In the 20th century, less than 1 in 20 people work on the land
in food production. The ancient dream of humanity, of release from
toil, seems to have been fulfilled.
But there's a catch. The 18 out of 20 people freed from work on
the land were not freed from all work. Human idleness, on average,
did not rise from 5% idle (19 out of 20 people working) to 95% idle
(1 out of 20 working). As farming machinery displaced people from the
land, these people were obliged to earn their living in some other way.
Since the necessities of life - food and shelter - were largely
being provided by a minority of the population, they could only earn
a living by making and selling luxuries. Curtains for windows,
carpets for floors, upholstered furniture, fashion clothes and
shoes, art, music, poetry, novels. And, of course, sex and drugs.
Everyone worked just as hard as before, but now most of them were
making and selling luxuries.
So the effect of technological innovation in agriculture was not
to reduce human work rates by 90%, but to keep everyone working as
hard as they had before, but now producing 20 times more goods.
Technological innovation has resulted not in increased human freedom,
but in increased productivity. And this rise in productivity has
meant that natural resources are consumed 20 times faster than before,
and 20 times as much pollution is generated, to the point where human
industry is arguably having global climatic consequences in the form
of acid rain, ozone depletion, and a buildup of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere.
This exchange of one form of obligatory work - growing wheat on
farms - to another form of obligatory work - sewing sequins on dresses -
represents no real improvement in the human condition. Life, for most
people, most of the time, continues to be as much one of obligatory
year-round work as it was in any preceding century. And, indeed, with
the gradual lapse of the mandatory work-free religious sabbath, that
work is liable to intensify rather than diminish.
The modern Western world is materially richer than it ever was.
There is food, shelter, carpets and curtains, art and music.
But Western man is as much constrained to a monastic cell as
his ancestors: it is simply that the cell to which the exhausted
monk returns is decorated with carpets and curtains and cushions,
with paintings on the walls, and a TV in the corner.
The obligatory production of luxuries, the necessitation of the
unnecessary, is the glaring absurdity of the modern era.
For, since technology does not free men
from work, men must continually hunt around for something - anything -
to sell. If that happens to be weapons, or instruments of torture,
that is what must be sold. Or if it the most obscene and degraded
pornography, so be it. Or if it is a drug whose
addictive character is such as to ensure an captive clientelle, so
much the better. And since nobody actually needs any of these products,
a barrage of advertising has to be used to convince buyers that they
need what they don't. And at the same time, precisely because these
products are unnecessary, and the demand driven by fashion, it is
quite possible that what sells like hot cakes one day will find no
buyers the next, and a profound insecurity and uncertainty applies
to every occupation.